We study competitive diffusion games on graphs introduced by Alon et al.
Introduction
Social networks, and the diffusion of information within them, yields an interesting and well-researched field of study. Among other models, competitive diffusion games have been introduced by Alon et al. [1] as a game-theoretic approach towards modelling the process of diffusion (or propagation) of influence (or information in general) in social networks. Such models have applications in "viral marketing" where several companies (or brands) compete in influencing as many customers (of products) or users (of technologies) as possible by initially selecting only a "small" subset of target users that will "infect" a large number of other users. Herein, the network is modelled as an undirected graph where the vertices correspond to the users, with edges modelling influence relations between them. The companies, being the players of the corresponding diffusion game, choose an initial subset of target vertices which then influence other neighboring vertices via a certain propagation process. More concretely, a vertex adopts a company's product at some specific time during the process if he is influenced by (that is, connected by an edge to) another vertex that already adopted this product. After adopting a product of one company, a vertex will never adopt any other product in the future. However, if a vertex gets influenced by several companies at the same time, then he will not adopt any of them and he is removed from the game. See Section 1.3 for the formal definitions of the game.
In their initial work, Alon et al. [1] studied how the existence of pure Nashequilibria is influenced by the diameter of the underlying graph. Following this line of research, Roshanbin [7] investigated the existence of Nash-equilibria for competitive diffusion games with two players on several classes of graphs such as paths, cycles and grid graphs. Notably, she proved that on sufficiently large grids, there always exists a Nash-equilibrium for two players, further conjecturing that there is no Nash-equilibrium for three players on grids. We extend the results of Roshanbin [7] for two players to three or more players on paths, cycles and grid graphs, proving the conjectured non-existence of a pure Nashequilibrium for three players on grids as a main result. An overview of our results is given in Section 1.2. After introducing the preliminaries in Section 1.3, we discuss our results for paths and cycles in Section 2, followed by the proof of our main theorem on grids in Section 3. We finish with some statements considering general graphs in Section 4.
Related Work
The study of influence maximization in social networks was initiated by Kempe et al. [5] . Several game-theoretic models have been suggested, including our model of reference, introduced by Alon et al. [1] . Some interesting generalizations of this model are the model by Tzoumas et al. [11] , who considered a more complex underlying diffusion process, and the model studied by Etesami and Basar [3] , allowing each player to choose multiple vertices. Dürr and Thang [2] and Mavronicolas et al. [6] studied so-called Voronoi games, which are closely related to our model (but not similar; there, players can share vertices). Concerning our model, Alon et al. [1] claimed the existence of pure Nash-equilibria for any number of players on graphs of diameter at most two, however, Takehara et al. [10] gave a counterexample consisting of a graph with nine vertices and diameter two with no Nash-equilibrium for two players.
Our main point of reference is the work of Roshanbin [7] , who studied the existence (and non-existence) of pure Nash-equilibria mainly for two players on special graph classes (paths, cycles, trees, unicycles, and grids); indeed, our work can be seen as an extension of that work to more than two players. Small [8] already showed that there is a Nash-equilibrium for any number of players on any star or clique. Small and Mason [9] proved that there is always a pure Nashequilibrium for two players on a tree, but not always for more than two players. Janssen and Vautour [4] considered safe strategies on trees and spider graphs, where a safe strategy is a strategy which maximizes the minimum pay-off of a certain player, when the minimum is taken over the possible unknown actions of the other players.
Our Results
We begin by characterizing the existence of Nash-equilibria for paths and cycles, showing that, except for three players on paths of length at least six, a Nash-equilibrium exists for any number of players playing on any such graph (Theorem 1 and 2). We then prove Conjecture 1 of Roshanbin [7] , showing that there is no Nash-equilibrium for three players on G m×n , as long as both m and n are at least 5 (Theorem 3). Finally, we investigate the minimum number of vertices such that there is an arbitrary graph with no Nash-equilibrium for k players. We prove an upper bound showing that there always exists a tree on ⌊ 3 2 k⌋ + 2 vertices with no Nash-equilibrium for k players (Theorem 4).
Preliminaries
Notation. For i, j ∈ N with i < j, we define [i, j] := {i, . . . , j} and [i] := {1, . . . , i}. We consider simple, finite, undirected graphs G = (V, E) with vertex set V and edge set E ⊆ {{u, v} | u, v ∈ V }. A path P n = (V, E) on n vertices is the graph with V = [n] and
For m, n ∈ N, the m × n grid G m×n = (V, E) is a graph with vertices
. We use the term position for a vertex x ∈ V . We define the distance of two positions x = (x 1 , y 1 ), y = (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ V as x − y 1 := |x 1 − x 2 | + |y 1 − y 2 | (note that this corresponds to the length of a shortest path from x to y in the grid). We denote the number of players by k and enumerate the players as Player 1, . . ., Player k. Diffusion Game on Graphs. A game Γ = (G, k) is defined by an undirected graph G = (V, E) and a number k of players, each having its distinct color in [k] . The strategy space of each player is V , such that each Player i selects a single vertex v i ∈ V at time 0, which is then colored by her color i. If two players choose the same vertex v, then this vertex is removed from the graph. For Player i, we use the terms strategy and position interchangeably, to mean its chosen vertex. A strategy profile is a tuple (v 1 , . . . , v k ) ∈ V k containing the initially chosen vertex for each player. The pay-off U i (v 1 , . . . , v k ) of Player i is the number of vertices with color i after the following propagation process. At time t + 1, any so far uncolored vertex that has only uncolored neighbors and neighbors colored in i (and no neighbors with other colors j ∈ [k] \ {i}) is colored in i. Any uncolored vertex with more than two different colors among its neighbors is removed from the graph. The process terminates when the coloring of the vertices does not change between consecutive steps. A strategy profile (v 1 , . . . , v k ) is a (pure) Nash-equilibrium if, for any player i ∈ [k] and any vertex v ′ ∈ V , it holds that 
Paths and Cycles
In this section, we fully characterizing the existence of Nash-equilibria on paths and cycles, for any number k of players.
Theorem 1. For any k ∈ N and any n ∈ N, there is a Nash-equilibrium for k players on P n , except for k = 3 and n ≥ 6.
The general idea of the proof is to pair the players and distribute these pairs evenly. In the rest of the section, we prove three Lemmas whose straight-forward combination proves Theorem 1. Lemma 1. For any even k ∈ N and any n ∈ N, there is a Nash-equilibrium for k players on P n .
Proof. If n ≤ k, then a strategy profile where each vertex of the path is chosen by at least one player is clearly a Nash-equilibrium.
Otherwise, if n > k, then the idea is to build pairs of players, which are then placed such that two paired players are neighbors and the distance of any two consecutive pairs is roughly equal (specifically, differs by at most two). See Figure 1 for an example. Intuitively, this yields a Nash-equilibrium since each player obtains roughly the same pay-off (specifically, differing by at most one), therefore no player can improve. Since we have n vertices, we want each player's pay-off to be at least z := ⌊ n k ⌋. This leaves r := n mod k other vertices, which we distribute between the first r players such that the pay-off of any player is at most z + 1. This can be achieved as follows. Let p i ∈ [n] denote the position of Player i, that is, the index of the chosen vertex on the path. We define
Note that, by construction, it holds that p 1 ∈ {z, z + 1} and p k = n − z + 1. Moreover, for each odd indexed player i ≥ 3, we have that 2z
, which proves the claim. To see that the strategy profile (p 1 , . . . , p k ) is a Nash-equilibrium, consider an arbitrary player i and any other strategy p ′ i ∈ [n] that she picks. Clearly, we can
We can modify the construction given in the proof of Lemma 1 to also work for odd numbers k greater than three.
Lemma 2. For any odd k > 3 ∈ N and for any n ∈ N, there is a Nashequilibrium for k players on P n .
Proof. We give a strategy profile based on the construction for an even number of players (proof of Lemma 1). The idea is to pair the players, placing the remaining lonely player between two consecutive pairs. This is best explained using a reduction to the even case. Specifically, given the strategy profile (p
) for an even number k + 1 of players on P n+1 as constructed in the proof of Lemma 1, we define the strategy pro-
. To see why this results in a Nash-equilibrium, let z := ⌊(n + 1)/(k + 1)⌋ and note that by construction it holds that p 1 ∈ {z, z + 1}, p k = n − z + 1, and 2z
. Moreover, each player receives a pay-off of at least z, therefore all players (except for Player (k − 2)) cannot improve by the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 1. Regarding Player (k − 2), note that her pay-off is 
which is equal to the above pay-off since p k−1 − p k−2 and p k−2 − p k−3 cannot both be even, by construction.
It remains to discuss the fairly simple (non)-existence of Nash-equilibria for three players. Note that Roshanbin [7] already stated without proof that there is no Nash-equilibrium for three players on G 2×n and G 3×n and Small and Mason [9] showed that there is no Nash-equilibrium for three players on P 7 . For the sake of completeness, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For three players, there is a Nash-equilibrium on P n if and only if n ≤ 5.
Proof. If n ≤ 3, then a strategy profile where each vertex of the path is chosen by at least one player is clearly a Nash-equilibrium. For n ∈ {4, 5}, the strategy profile (2, 3, 4) is a Nash-equilibrium.
To see that there is no Nash-equilibrium for n ≥ 6, consider an arbitrary strategy profile (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ). Without loss of generality, we can assume that p 1 < p 2 < p 3 and consider the following two cases. First, we assume that p 2 = p 1 + 1 and p 3 = p 2 + 1. If p 1 > 2, then Player 2 increases her pay-off by choosing p 1 − 1. Otherwise, it holds that p 3 < n − 1 and Player 2 increases her pay-off by moving to p 3 + 1. Therefore, this case does not yield a Nashequilibrium. For the remaining case, it holds that p 1 < p 2 − 1 or p 3 > p 2 + 1. If p 1 < p 2 − 1, then Player 1 increases her pay-off by moving to p 2 − 1, while if p 3 > p 2 + 1, then Player 3 increases her pay-off by moving to p 2 + 1. Thus, this case does not yield a Nash-equilibrium as well, and we are done.
We close this section with the following result considering cycles. Interestingly, for cycles there exists a Nash-equilibrium also for three players.
Theorem 2. For any k, n ∈ N, there is a Nash-equilibrium for k players on C n .
Proof. It is an easy observation that the constructions given in the proofs of Lemma 1 and 2 also yield Nash-equilibria for cycles, that is, when the two endpoints of the path are connected by an edge. Thus, it remains to show a Nash-equilibrium for k = 3 players for any C n . We set p 1 := 1, p 2 := n and
It is not hard to check that (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ) is a Nash-equilibrium.
Grid Graphs
In this section we consider three players on the m × n grid G m×n and we prove the following main theorem.
Theorem 3. If n ≥ 5 and m ≥ 5, then there is no Nash-equilibrium for three players on G m×n .
Before proving the theorem, let us first introduce some general definitions and observations. Throughout this section, we denote the strategy of Player i, that is, the initially chosen vertex of Player i, by
. Note that any strategy profile where more than one player chooses the same position is never a Nash-equilibrium since in this case each of these players gets a pay-off of zero, and can improve its pay-off by choosing any free vertex (to obtain a pay-off of at least one). Therefore, we will assume without loss of generality that p 1 = p 2 = p 3 . Further, note that the game is highly symmetric with respect to the axes. Specifically, reflecting coordinates along a dimension, or rotating the grid by 90 degrees, yields the same outcome for the game. Thus, in what follows, we only consider possible cases up to the above symmetries.
We define ∆ x := max i,j∈[k] |x i − x j | and ∆ y := max i,j∈[k] |y i − y j | to be the maximum coordinate-wise differences among the positions of the players. We say that a player strictly controls the other two players, if both reside on the same side of the player, in both dimensions.
Definition 1.
We now prove Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. Let m ≥ 5 and n ≥ 5. We perform a case distinction based on the relative positions of the three players. As a first case, we consider strategy profiles where the players are playing "far" from each other, that is, there are two players whose positions differ by at least four in some coordinate (formally max{∆ x , ∆ y } ≥ 3). For these profiles, we distinguish two subcases, namely, whether there existss a player who strictly controls the others (Lemma 4) or not (Lemma 5). We prove that none of these cases yields a Nash-equilibrium by showing that there always exists a player who can improve is pay-off. Notably, the improving player always moves closer to the other two players. We are left with the case where the players are playing "close" to each other, in the sense that their positions all lie inside a 3 × 3 subgrid (that is, max{∆ x , ∆ y } ≤ 2). For these strategy profiles, we show that there always exists a player who can improve her pay-off (Lemma 6), however the improving position depends not only on the relative positions between the players, but also on the global positioning of this subgrid on the overall grid. This leads to a somewhat erratic behaviour, which we overcome by considering all possible close positions (up to symmetries) in the proof of Lemma 6. Altogether, Lemmas 4, 5 and 6 cover all possible strategy profiles (ruling them out as Nash-equilibria), thus implying the theorem.
In order to conclude Theorem 3, it remains to prove the lemmas mentioned in the case distinction discussed above. To this end, we start with two easy preliminary results. First, we observe (as can be easily proven by induction) that a vertex for which the player with the shortest distance to it is unique is colored in that player's color.
, then x will be colored in color i at the end of the propagation process.
Based on Observation 1, we show that whenever a player has distance at least three to the other players and both of them are positioned on the same side of that player (with respect to both dimensions), then she can improve her pay-off by moving closer to the others (see Figure 2 for an illustration). 
≤ x j , y 1 ≤ y j , and p 1 − p j 1 ≥ 3 holds for j ∈ {2, 3}, then Player 1 can increase her pay-off by moving to (x 1 + 1, y 1 + 1). To see that Player 1 strictly increases her pay-off, note that p
Hence, Player 1 now has the unique shortest distance to all those positions where the distance from p 1 was at most one larger than the shortest distance from any other player (clearly, there exists at least one such position with color j = 1). By Observation 1, these positions now get color 1, thus Player 1 strictly increases her pay-off.
We go on to prove the lemmas, starting with the case that the players play far from each other. The following lemma handles the first subcase, that is, where one of the players strictly controls the others.
Lemma 4.
A strategy profile with max{∆ x , ∆ y } ≥ 3 where one of the players strictly controls the others is not a Nash-equilibrium.
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that Player 1 strictly controls Player 2 and Player 3, specifically, we assume that x 1 < x 2 and y 1 < y 2 and x 1 < x 3 and y 1 < y 3 holds. Figure 3 depicts the three possible cases for the positions of Player 2 and Player 3. For each case, we show that a player which can improve her pay-off exists.
Case 1: We assume that (x 2 , y 2 ) = (x 1 +1, y 1 +1) and (x 3 , y 3 ) = (x 1 +1, y 1 +1).
By Proposition 1, Player 1 gets a higher pay-off from (x 1 + 1, y 1 + 1).
Case 2:
We assume without loss of generality that (x 2 , y 2 ) = (x 1 + 1, y 1 + 1). (a) We assume x 2 < x 3 and y 2 < y 3 . Then, x 3 > x 2 + 1 or y 3 > y 2 + 1 holds since max{∆ x , ∆ y } ≥ 3. Note that Player 3 strictly controls Player 1 and Player 2 and that this case is symmetric to Case 1.
(b)
We assume x 2 ≥ x 3 or y 2 ≥ y 3 . Then, it holds that x 3 = x 2 or y 3 = y 2 . We assume x 3 = x 2 (the argument for y 3 = y 2 being analogous). Since max{∆ x , ∆ y } ≥ 3, we have y 3 > y 2 + 1, thus The other subcase, where no player strictly controls the others, is handled by the following lemma.
Lemma 5. A strategy profile with max{∆ x , ∆ y } ≥ 3 where no player strictly controls the others is not a Nash-equilibrium.
Proof. If no player strictly controls the others, then it follows that at least two players have the same coordinate in at least one dimension. We perform a case distinction on the cases as depicted in Figure 4 .
Case 1: All three players have the same coordinate in one dimension. We assume that x 1 = x 2 = x 3 (the case y 1 = y 2 = y 3 is analogous). Without loss of generality also y 1 < y 2 < y 3 holds. Since max{∆ x , ∆ y } ≥ 3, it follows that y i+1 − y i ≥ 2 holds for some i ∈ {1, 2}, say for i = 2. Clearly, Player 3 can improve her pay-off by choosing (x 3 , y 2 +1) (analogous to Case 2b in the proof of Lemma 4).
Case 2:
There is a dimension where two players have the same coordinate but not all three players have the same coordinate in any dimension. We assume x 1 = x 2 < x 3 and y 1 < y 2 (all other cases are analogous).
We also assume that y 1 ≤ y 3 ≤ y 2 , since otherwise Player 3 strictly controls the others, and this case is handled by Lemma 4. (a) We assume that y 2 = y 1 + 1. Then x 3 ≥ x 1 + 3 holds since max{∆ x , ∆ y } ≥ 3. Player 3 increases her pay-off by moving to (x 1 + 2, y 1 ) (analogous to Case 2b in the proof of Lemma 4).
(b) We assume that y 2 = y 1 + 2. Then x 3 ≥ x 1 + 3 holds since max{∆ x , ∆ y } ≥ 3. Player 3 increases her pay-off by moving to (x 1 + 2, y 1 + 1) (analogous to Case 2b in the proof of Lemma 4).
(c) We assume that y 2 > y 1 + 2 and |y 2 − y 3 | ≤ |y 1 − y 3 |. That is, without loss of generality, Player 3 is closer to Player 2. Then, by Proposition 1, Player 1 increases her pay-off by moving to (x 1 + 1, y 1 + 1).
It remains to consider the cases where the players play close to each other.
Lemma 6.
A strategy profile with max{∆ x , ∆ y } ≤ 2 is not a Nash-equilibrium.
Proof. First, we assume that ∆ x + ∆ y ≥ 2, as otherwise there would be at least two players on the same position (so each one of them can improve by moving to any free vertex). Without loss of generality, we also assume that ∆ x ≤ ∆ y , leaving the following cases to consider (depicted in Figure 5 ). Hence, assume y > 1, and observe that both the pay-off of Player 1 from (x + 1, y − 1) and the pay-off of Player 3 from (x, y − 1) equals m(y − 1). Assuming that we have a Nash-equilibrium, we obtain the two inequations xy ≥ m(y − 1) and (m − x)(y + 1) ≥ m(y − 1), which yield m(y − 1)/y ≤ x ≤ 2m/(y + 1). Note that we obtain a contradiction for y ≥ 3. Hence, we can assume that y = 2 and ⌈m/2⌉ ≤ x ≤ ⌊2m/3⌋. If n ≥ 6, then Player 1 can improve by choosing (x, 5) achieving a pay-off of m(n − 4) ≥ 2m > 2x. Thus, we also assume n = 5. Now, Player 1 can choose position (x − 1, 4) to color all but three positions in [x − 1] × [5] . The only positions which she does not color are (x − 1, 2), (x − 1, 1) and (x − 2, 1). Her pay-off is thus 5(x − 1) − 3, which, for all x ≥ ⌈m/2⌉ ≥ 3, is more than 2x. If y = n − 2, then Player 3's pay-off is exactly m. Therefore, she increases her pay-off by moving to (y − 1, x), because then her pay-off is at least 2m. Thus, we can assume that y < n − 2. If x ≥ m − 2, then Player 2's pay-off is either 1 or 3 (it is 1 if x = m − 1 and 3 if x = m − 2). Therefore, she increases her pay-off by moving to (x − 2, y), because then her pay-off is at least n (and n ≥ 5). Thus, we can assume that x < m − 2. We are left only with the case where y < n − 2 and x < m − 2. In this case, Player 2 increases her pay-off by moving to (x + 2, y + 2). By Proposition 1, Player 1 increases her pay-off by moving to (x 1 + 1, y 1 + 1).
, (x 2 , y 2 ) = (x + 1, y + 2), and (x 3 , y 3 ) = (x + 2, y + 2) be the positions of the three players. By Proposition 1, Player 1 increases her pay-off by moving to (x 1 + 1, y 1 + 1).
, (x 2 , y 2 ) = (x + 1, y + 1), and (x 3 , y 3 ) = (x + 2, y + 2) be the positions of the three players.
Notice that the pay-off of Player 2 is only one. It is clear that Player 2 increases her pay-off more by moving to (x, y + 1), because then her pay-off is at least two, as she also colors the position (x, y + 2). 
General Graphs
In this section, we study the existence of Nash-equilibria on arbitrary graphs. Using computer simulations, we found that for two players, a Nash-equilibrium exists on any graph with at most n = 7 vertices. For n = 8, we obtained the graph depicted in Figure 6 , for which there is no Nash-equilibrium for two players. As it is clear that adding isolated vertices to the graph in Figure 6 does not allow for a Nash-equilibrium, we conclude the following.
Corollary 1. For two players, there is a Nash-equilibrium on each n-vertex graph if and only if n ≤ 7.
For more than two players, we can show the following.
Figure 7: A tree with no Nash-equilibrium for 9 players.
Theorem 4. For any k > 2 and any n ≥ ⌊ 3 2 k⌋ + 2, there exists a tree with n vertices such that there is no Nash-equilibrium for k players.
Proof. We describe a construction only for n = ⌊ 3 2 k⌋ + 2, as we can add arbitrarily many isolated vertices without introducing a Nash-equilibrium.
We first describe the construction for k being odd. We create one P 3 , whose vertices we denote by u 1 , u 2 , and u 3 , such that u 2 is the middle vertex of this P 3 .
we create a copy of P 3 , denoted by P i , whose vertices we denote by v i,1 , v i,2 , and v i,3 , such that v i,2 is the middle vertex of P i . For each i ∈ [2, ⌈ k 2 ⌉], we connect v i,1 to u 3 . An example for k = 9 is depicted in Figure 7 . To see that there is no Nash-equilibrium for the constructed graph, consider first strategy profiles for which u 3 is free (that is, no player chooses u 3 ). If also both u 1 and u 2 are free, then there exists some P i with at least 2 occupied vertices (by the pigeon-hole principle). It is clear that at least one of the players occupying these vertices can increase her pay-off by moving to u 3 . If u 1 and u 2 are both occupied, then there exists some P i with at most 1 occupied vertex (again, by the pigeon-hole principle). It is clear that the player occupying this vertex can increase her pay-off by moving to u 3 . If only one vertex out of u 1 and u 2 is occupied, then the player occupying this vertex can increase her payoff by moving to u 3 . Therefore, we can assume that u 3 is occupied. In this case, it holds that if both u 1 and u 2 are free, then at least one player has a pay-off of 1, and she gains more by moving to u 2 . If both u 1 and u 2 are occupied, then at least one P i has at most one occupied vertex, and this occupied vertex can only be v i,1 , therefore the player occupying u 2 gains more by moving to v i,2 . Lastly, if exactly one out of u 1 and u 2 is free, then at least one P i1 has at most one occupied vertex, and this occupied vertex can only be v i1,1 . Moreover, at least one P i2 has at least two occupied vertices, therefore a player occupying one of these vertices gains more by moving to v i1,2 . Therefore, this graph has no Nash-equilibrium for k players.
For k being even, we create one P 2 , whose vertices we denote by u 1 , u 2 . For each i ∈ [2, k 2 + 1], we create a copy of P 3 , denoted by P i , whose vertices we denote by v i,1 , v i,2 , and v i,3 , such that v i,2 is the middle vertex of P i . For each i ∈ [2, k 2 + 1], we connect v i,1 to u 2 . This graph has no Nash-equilibrium for k players, as can be verified by a similar analysis as above.
Conclusion
We studied competitive diffusion games for three or more players on paths, cycles and grid graphs, answering-as a main contribution-an open question concerning the existence of a Nash-equilibrium for three players on grids [7] negatively. Moreover, we provide a first systematic study of this game for more than two players. However, there are several questions left open, of which we mention some here.
An immediate question (generalizing Theorem 3) is whether a Nash-equilibrium exists for more than three players on a grid. Also, giving a lower bound for the number of vertices n such that there is a graph with n vertices with no Nash-equilibrium for k players is an interesting question as it is not clear that the upper bounds given in Theorem 4 are optimal. In other words, is it true that n ≤ 3 2 k + 1 implies the existence of a Nash-equilibrium for k players?
